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ON LEGITIMACY THEORY AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF TRUTH 
COMMISSIONS 
JAMES L. GIBSON* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The world has clearly registered its opinion about the desirability and 
effectiveness of truth commissions. From South Korea to Peru, truth 
commissions (and functionally equivalent institutions) have been established as 
a means of addressing historical injustices.1 Indeed, out of the limited list of 
mechanisms for dealing with historical injustices and preparing a pathway 
toward a more secure and democratic future, truth commissions stand out as a 
very common choice of states haunted by their own histories.2 
But are truth commissions effective? Of course, the first part of the answer 
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 1. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South 
Africa, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 409, 409–10 (2006) (noting the establishment of about two dozen such 
commissions). 
 2. Id. (noting its popularity); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING 
STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 251 (2001) (predicting increased use of truth commissions in the 
future).  Hayner documents and compares attributes of all twenty-one truth commissions that had been 
created by the turn of the century, from the Uganda commission in 1974 to the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of 2000–2001. Id. at 32–71. 
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to this question requires an answer to an earlier query: Effective at what? Can a 
truth commission create a democratic political system? Probably not. Can it 
erase a history of intense political conflict, bringing all sides together in a spirit 
of mutual respect and cooperation? Surely not. But, to lower our expectations, 
can a truth commission contribute to a collective memory for a society, 
providing at least some common understanding of a country’s conflictual past, 
including some appreciation of the motives of “the enemy”? Can a truth 
commission contribute to the development of a rule-of-law culture that respects 
human rights and thereby raises the costs of future efforts to violate the human 
rights of the citizenry? Can a truth commission advance political tolerance, a 
central component of a democratic political culture and a necessary ingredient 
for coexistence? The answers to these questions, while still subject to 
considerable disagreement and debate, are most likely that, under at least some 
conditions and to at least a limited degree, truth commissions can indeed 
contribute to societal transformation. 
Indeed, rigorous empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the South 
African truth and reconciliation process supports this conclusion.3 It appears 
that the South African process generated a truth about the past that is fairly 
widely accepted. It appears as well that those who buy into that truth tend to be 
more reconciled with the country’s past, their fellow South Africans, and the 
political institutions of the country’s new dispensation. And it seems that this 
reconciliation has been crucial in buying the South African transition some 
breathing space during which nascent democratic institutions and processes 
have been established and nurtured. The truth and reconciliation process in 
South Africa did not produce a secure, consolidated, democratic political 
system (in terms of either culture or institutions). But available evidence 
suggests that some portion of the South African “miracle” can reasonably be 
attributed to the success of the Commission’s efforts to find truth and create 
reconciliation.4 
At the same time, however, truth commissions often fail, even when 
expectations are minimal. Many commissions appear to have had little, if any, 
impact on societal transformations. Indeed, some view commissions as the 
product of social change rather than the cause of it.5 Although it is certainly too 
 
 3. See generally JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A 
DIVIDED NATION? (2004) (reporting on South African survey of views about the effectiveness of the 
South African TRC for healing and transforming South African society). 
 4. For a discussion on the South African “miracle,” see ALLISTER SPARKS, BEYOND THE 
MIRACLE: INSIDE THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 4 (2003), which notes that the struggle against apartheid 
was itself bloody and that few prognosticators expected that the apartheid state would be defeated 
without anything short of a full-blown civil war. Conventional wisdom is that more South Africans died 
in the political violence in the 1990–1994 period than in all other periods of South African history. 
 5. See, e.g., Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in 
Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L. SECURITY 5, 31 (2003) (finding that truth commissions are 
often used by already strong, stable, reformist states to gain cooperation from potential spoilers to the 
peace). 
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soon to assess many of the ongoing efforts at truth and reconciliation 
throughout the world today, it would not be terribly surprising to find that truth 
commissions more often fail than succeed. 
What, then, contributes to success at creating truth and stimulating 
reconciliation? Few would argue with the assertion that the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is among the most successful in 
the world; indeed, the TRC is widely emulated by societies seeking some sort of 
transition from atrocities in the past to more-peaceful and democratic politics in 
the future.6 But what key elements of the South African process contributed to 
its success? Are these factors generalizable to other polities, cultures, and 
circumstances? It is important to determine what lessons can be learned from 
the South African experience, and to provide some desiderata for those who 
would use truth as a mean of enhancing reconciliation and democratic change. 
The central thesis of this article is that the effectiveness of truth 
commissions is dependent upon two crucial factors: (1) whether the commission 
is able to attract the attention of its constituents and (2) whether the 
commission is perceived as legitimate among members of the mass public. 
Getting its constituents’ attention is determined largely by the type of messages 
the commission promulgates, with simple messages stressing “human interest” 
aspects of atrocities being the most effective and with formal trials being the 
least so. Legitimacy is enhanced by meeting expectations of fairness—especially 
the principal expectation of evenhandedness—in decisionmaking processes. To 
the extent that a truth commission is perceived as using fair procedures, its 
messages will be perceived as objective and the commission itself credible. 
Credible commissions are persuasive. 
In sum, the job of a truth commission is to change beliefs and attitudes as a 
process of societal transformation. In order to do so, it must capture the 
attention of ordinary people, and be perceived as a credible source of both 
information about the past and guidance about political activity in the future. 
 
 
 6. For additional information about the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see 
generally ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2000) (giving the insider’s view of the politics of South Africa’s TRC); 
PUMLA GOBODO-MADIKIZELA, A HUMAN BEING DIED THAT NIGHT: A SOUTH AFRICAN STORY OF 
FORGIVENESS (2003) (documenting the transformation of an individual commissioner through the 
author’s meetings with one of apartheid’s worst assassins); WENDY ORR, FROM BIKO TO BASSON: 
WENDY ORR’S SEARCH FOR THE SOUL OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A COMMISSIONER OF THE TRC (2000) 
(providing a personal insider’s story that is connected to specific cases before the TRC); CHARLES 
VILLA-VICENCIO & WILHELM VERWOERD, LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS 
ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA (2000) (providing a highly 
informative anthology on truth commissions). 
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II 
WHAT OBJECTIVES OUGHT TRUTH COMMISSIONS TO PURSUE? 
Truth commissions are often charged with many different responsibilities, 
ranging from dealing with specific human-rights abuses to transforming whole 
societies.7 The South African case clearly sought broad social changes—a more 
reconciled society—even while it addressed the complaints of victims and the 
pleas of perpetrators for amnesty.8 The South African emphasis on societal 
change, however, is perhaps unique among truth commissions throughout the 
world; more common are truth commissions that focus on victims and 
perpetrators.9 
Under most conditions, truth commissions, whose primary concern is to 
punish perpetrators and appease victims, are unlikely to have broader social 
influence. Nonetheless, this article is little concerned with the effects of truth 
commissions on active participants in the transition struggle. Can a truth 
commission provide a means for either punishing perpetrators or, as in amnesty 
schemes, trading absolution for information? Probably. Can—and should—a 
truth commission compensate victims? Certainly. Should a truth commission 
document atrocities in the past, attempting to develop a record of abuse that 
most if not all will accept? Undoubtedly. 
But truth commissions are most effective when they attempt to transform a 
society rather than focus primarily on the needs of victims and perpetrators. To 
transform a society, it is the bystanders—the great mass of most societies—who 
are crucial, not the active participants. Indeed, these participants—victims and 
perpetrators—can often detract from these larger objectives of truth 
commissions. Those directly engaged in the struggle are often “spoilers” in 
transitional politics, making the necessary compromises more difficult to 
achieve. Therefore, it is often necessary to provide incentives for these former 
combatants to disengage from the transformation process so that reconciliation 
efforts can be focused on the majority of the society.10 Of course, not all truth 
commissions claim goals as lofty and as all-encompassing as the TRC—indeed, 
few do11—but if a truth commission is to be effective at changing a society, it 
must have as its primary objective the transformation of the society and make 
secondary attention to victims and perpetrators. 
 
 7. HAYNER, supra, note 2, at 15–16; MARK FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS 36–37 (2006). 
 8. James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?, 603 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 82, 86–87 (2006). 
 9. See, e.g., Tristan Anne Borer, A Taxonomy of Victims and Perpetrators: Human Rights and 
Reconciliation in South Africa, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 1088, 1088–1116 (2003) (explaining that the distinction 
between perpetrators and victims is commonly made in South Africa). 
 10. Of course, in some societies human-rights abuses have been so widespread that nearly 
everyone is a victim or a perpetrator (for instance, Rwanda). Different strategies are likely necessary 
under those circumstances. 
 11. HAYNER, supra note 2, at 160. 
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The single most important attribute of the truth and reconciliation process 
in South Africa was that the entire process was designed as an effort at societal 
change.12 According to the TRC, “[r]econciliation requires that all South 
Africans accept moral and political responsibility for nurturing a culture of 
human rights and democracy within which political and socio-economic 
conflicts are addressed both seriously and in a non-violent manner.”13 In an 
effort to address this mandate, the Final Report of the TRC included in its 
recommendations a section on the “promotion of a human rights culture.”14 
Although the TRC was obviously concerned with the fate of victims and 
perpetrators, its genius was that it defined its ultimate objective in terms of 
transforming South African society. The target of its activities was thus society 
at large rather than just the active participants in the struggle over apartheid. 
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Figure 1: A Macro-Level Model of the Influence of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Process 
This model depicts truth processes as both independent and dependent 
variables. That is, undoubtedly, truth processes are endogenous—their very 
existence is a function of the attributes of the broader society in which they are 
embedded. Not every type of truth process is compatible with every type of 
political culture, and the selection of types of institutions is not independent of 
the dominant values within any given political system. 
Consider, for example, the South African case, in which relatively few 
victims were physically harmed or incarcerated during apartheid. In fact, it 
turns out that a quite small proportion of the population came forth with claims 
of gross human violations (about 21,000 people).16 This relatively small number 
is due in part, of course, to a reasonably restrictive definition of what constitutes 
a gross human-rights violation. But it is nonetheless certain that there were 
fewer of these violations under apartheid in South Africa than in many other 
countries (for example, in Rwanda).17 And it is also true that surveys have not 
found that apartheid succeeded in creating a society of self-defined victims.18 
For instance, when asked in a South African national survey whether they had 
suffered any harm under apartheid, fully sixty-eight percent of the black 
respondents claimed they had not been injured by apartheid.19 This is an 
astounding figure. Of course, when provided with specific examples of injuries, 
the percentages are higher. At one extreme, only a relatively small proportion 
of these respondents—ten percent—was actually imprisoned by the 
 
 16. 1998 FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 196. 
 17. See, e.g., Stephanie Nieuwoudt, African Justice: Drawing Parallels, ICC-AFRICA UPDATE, 
Sept. 5, 2006, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=323668&apc_state=henh. 
 18. See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 37–46 (detailing survey results on experiences of South Africans). 
 19. See fig. 2, infra p. 124. 
11_GIBSON_CONTRACT PROOF.DOC 8/28/2009  1:44:02 PM 
Spring 2009] LEGITIMACY THEORY  129 
authorities.20 At the other, forty-four percent claimed harm from not having 
been permitted to associate with people of different races or colors.21 Lack of 
access to education was another widely experienced harm.22 Still, a large 
minority of Africans (thirty-nine percent) claimed no specific injuries from this 
set of comprehensive questions on apartheid injuries.23 Indeed, only slightly 
more than one-third claimed to have been subjected to the infamous pass laws.24 
This is the context within which South Africa’s TRC began its work. 
 
The Injuries of Apartheid
General Specific
Not Injured
68%
Injured
61%
Not Injured
39%
Injured
32%
 
 
Figure 2: The Injuries of Apartheid 
The intention here is not to depreciate the tremendous damage that 
apartheid did to South Africans, especially black South Africans. Nonetheless, 
the fact remains that the struggle over apartheid was not a civil war, and the 
struggle over apartheid did not directly engage or perhaps even directly affect 
vast proportions of blacks, whites, Coloured25 people, or those of Asian origin. 
This no doubt makes reconciliation a less demanding task and suggests the 
 
 20. Id. at 41. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. The term “Coloured” is used here as it is in South Africa to denote people of mixed race. 
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general hypothesis that the larger the proportion of bystanders during a 
conflict, the more likely is an attempt at reconciliation. If so, then truth and 
reconciliation processes might not be so easily created or their goals achieved in 
polities in which historical grievances are commonplace among a high 
proportion of the population. 
In general, it is reasonable to hypothesize that truth commissions with broad 
powers of enhancing societal reconciliation are more likely to be formed, and to 
succeed, in societies in which the size of the victimized population is small. 
When the victim class becomes large, it becomes politically influential, and it 
often seeks to transform the truth and reconciliation process into one focused 
primarily on the needs and aspirations of the victims. Societal reconciliation 
may be impeded by such influence. 
Figure 1 suggests a number of factors influencing truth commissions, each of 
which deserves and has received detailed consideration.26 But Figure 1 also 
points to three factors that contribute independently to a truth commission’s 
having an impact on society: (1) evenhandedness, (2) leadership, and (3) 
societal penetration. Leadership refers to the crucial roles of Nelson Mandela 
and Desmond Tutu.27 Because neither Mandela nor Tutu is easily replicable in 
other societies, however, the more interesting factors are evenhandedness and 
societal penetration. Both of these factors have to do with change in the 
attitudes of individuals, and therefore a micro-level model is necessary to 
complement the processes depicted in Figure 1. 
IV 
A SIMPLE MICRO-LEVEL THEORY OF THE SUCCESS OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
The model depicted in Figure 1 concerns processes taking place at the 
macro-level of the polity. For that model to establish its credibility and utility, 
an understanding of micro-level processes must be added. This micro-level 
model is essentially one of persuasive communications and attitude change. In 
this analysis, such attitude change is embedded within a larger theory of the 
legitimacy of institutions. 
Assuming a goal of societal transformation, the question becomes, What 
makes truth commissions effective? A simple theory helps answer this question: 
1. In order to transform a society, individuals must be transformed. 
2. This process of transformation is one of individual attitude change. 
3. In order for attitudes to change, ordinary people must pay attention to 
the actions and findings of truth commissions. 
4. Attitudes can be changed by new information, but only when the source 
of that information is credible. 
 
 26. See Gibson, supra note 1, at 420–31 (discussing factors influencing truth commissions). 
 27. See Gibson, supra note 8, at 104–05 (discussing the persuasiveness of Mandela and Tutu in 
calling for reconciliation). 
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5. In the context of truth commissions, credibility is most strongly 
enhanced by impartiality and evenhandedness. 
6. Perceptions of the decisionmaking processes of commissions—in 
particular, their perceived fairness—contribute mightily to assessments 
of the credibility of commission outputs. 
7. Truth commissions must therefore adopt transparent decisionmaking 
processes that allow them to be perceived as credible and legitimate 
among ordinary people in a society. 
In short, 
EVENHANDEDNESS    FAIRNESS    LEGITIMACY   
CREDIBILITY    ATTITUDE CHANGE 
To the extent that a truth commission seeks effective societal change, 
establishing broad legitimacy within that society is of utmost importance. 
Reconciliation is about individual change, and in particular change in 
beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors. Truth processes assume that the 
infusion of new information (the “truth”) can lead citizens to reassess their 
views about the past, and especially their beliefs and judgments about those 
who were formerly their enemies.28 The truth need not concern individual 
events but instead can be a broader truth about the nature of the ancien regime. 
Some believe this attitude change must involve forgiveness and some sort of 
redemption, but the minimal requirement of reconciliation is most likely 
tolerance: the willingness to “put up with” former enemies and to limit political 
competition to peaceful means within the context of democratic political 
institutions.29 How can truth commissions contribute to attitude change among 
the members of a society? 
Understanding how citizens’ attitudes change requires a broader theory of 
persuasive communications and especially a theory of how citizens relate to 
institutions such as truth commissions. The elaboration–likelihood model 
(ELM) provides such an understanding.30 Attitude change is a function of four 
factors: ability, motivations, attentiveness, and analysis. ELM holds that “if 
receivers are able and properly motivated, they will elaborate, or systematically 
 
 28. Id. at 89, 101 (discussing the change in views, beliefs, and judgments that make TRCs a 
success). 
 29. See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 213–14 (offering tolerance as a minimal requirement for 
reconciliation). For an examination on forces affecting tolerance and the necessity of tolerance for the 
success of an emerging democracy, see generally JAMES L. GIBSON & AMANDA GOUWS, 
OVERCOMING INTOLERANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: EXPERIMENTS IN DEMOCRATIC PERSUASION 
(2003). 
 30. For an explanation of ELM, see RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION 
AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 5 (1986). Pablo 
Briñol & Richard E. Petty, Fundamental Processes Leading to Attitude Change: Implications for Cancer 
Prevention Communications, 56 J. COMM. (SUPPLEMENT) S81, S87 (2006), provides a most useful 
overview of the ELM and attitude change, focusing on public campaigns concerning cancer prevention. 
A truth commission can easily be conceptualized as a public-relations campaign selling the “truth” 
about the past and a plan of action for the future. Id. 
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analyze, persuasive messages. If the message is well reasoned, data based, and 
logical ([that is], strong), it will persuade; if it is not, it will fail.”31 From the 
foregoing, the basic problems of attitude change in the context of truth and 
reconciliation processes appear to be, first, getting people to pay attention to 
the proceedings, and, second, ensuring that the information provided is not 
dismissed but is instead completely elaborated, thereby making attitude change 
a possibility. Unfortunately, the factors that often contribute to attentiveness 
also seem to impede attitude change. 
What are the lessons for truth commissions that emerge from the ELM? The 
answer lies in two crucial aspects of the process of attitude change: (1) getting 
the attention of the people, and (2) establishing the legitimacy, and thus the 
credibility, of the truth commission. 
A. Attentiveness 
Obviously, truth commissions cannot alter the analytical abilities of the 
citizens of a polity, but this does not render the “ability” portion of this model 
irrelevant. Truth commissions must speak to their constituents in a language 
that is understandable. In nearly all societies, this means that messages must be 
simple and accessible, not legalistic and technical. The most important attribute 
a simple message can have is personal relevance.32 
More generally, achieving attentiveness comes with two possible problems, 
determined largely by the degree of cognitive sophistication of the citizen. 
Among those with low cognitive sophistication, the problem is one of catching 
their attention. Such citizens may be only occasional consumers of the mass 
media, and they may lack the cognitive skills necessary to process even fairly 
simple information. The challenge for a truth commission is to make the costs 
of acquiring information low enough that unsophisticated people can become 
attentive and engaged.33 
In the South African case, information was widely available throughout 
society,34 in part owing to the TRC’s commitment to communicate with all 
sectors of South African society. 
[T]he South African Broadcast Corporation aired special reports on the TRC every 
Sunday from April 1996 until March of 1998, and the program often scored as among 
the most popular on South African television. And TV broadcasts were minuscule in 
comparison to radio exposure, which is crucial since radio is the most widely available 
 
 31. William D. Crano & Radmila Prislin, Attitudes and Persuasion, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 345, 
348 (2006). 
 32. See Briñol & Petty, supra note 30, at S83, S84 (pointing also to several other means by which 
messages can increase thinking, including by “summarizing the major arguments as questions rather 
than as assertions . . . by having the individual arguments presented by multiple independent sources 
rather than just one . . . and by making some aspect of the message surprising or unexpected”) 
(citations omitted). 
 33. See Gibson, supra note 1, at 416 (discussing the success of the South African TRC in this 
regard). 
 34. Id. 
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information medium for most South Africans.35 
This effective manner of disseminating information was paired with the 
emotionally moving quality of the information itself: the public’s attention was 
captured. The process made known, in highly personalized and often 
excruciating detail, the suffering and sorrow of hundreds if not thousands of 
individual South Africans. The atrocities committed during the struggle over 
apartheid were not abstractions, but were instead deeply human losses that 
resonated with South Africans of every color. Few black South Africans who 
heard Amy Biehl’s father testify to the TRC could have been unmoved. Few 
white South Africans who heard the stories of the families of the Cradock Four 
(represented in the movie Long Night’s Journey into Day36) could have avoided 
aching for the victims and their families. All were dismayed by Policeman 
Benzein’s demonstration of his notorious “wet bag” method of torture, 
broadcast widely throughout South Africa.37 
Messages that clearly involve emotional arousal get more attention than 
strictly cognitive ones.38 This type of fare is often addictive to ordinary people, 
and few in South Africa could have escaped exposure to the reports of the truth 
and reconciliation process. Through its numerous hearings in all parts of the 
country, including the hinterland, the TRC pierced the consciousness of nearly 
all South Africans.39 With such saturation, it seems likely that everyone got the 
opportunity to judge the TRC’s conclusions. 
The information propagated by the TRC “typically had no conspicuous 
ideological content; no obvious message was being sold.”40 Consequently, 
reports from the TRC did not necessarily raise the sort of defensive alarms that 
often prevent new information from bringing about attitude change. This flows 
in part from the human-interest dimensions of the reports, but also in part from 
the TRC’s conscious desire to reach all segments of society. 
Surely the truth and reconciliation process was used by some to launch ideological 
attacks on either the apartheid system or the liberation movement, but much of what 
the TRC put before the South African people was simple and subtle; it had to do with 
bad guys hurting good guys. Without an obvious and explicit ideological veneer, many 
of the messages and stories of the TRC were attractive and palatable to South 
Africans of many different ideological persuasions.41 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. A LONG NIGHT’S JOURNEY INTO DAY (Iris Films 2000). 
 37. See Gibson, supra note 8, at 101–02 (describing this method of torture). 
 38. See GEORGE E. MARCUS, W. RUSSELL NEUMAN & MICHAEL MACKUEN, AFFECTIVE 
INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT 10–11 (2000) (describing the surveillance system and its 
role in calling new stimuli to the attention of a decision maker). 
 39. See Gibson, supra note 8, at 102 (describing the effect of messages on the South African 
citizenry). 
 40. Id. at 101–02. 
 41. Gibson, supra note 8, at 102. For an example of the comparative value of subtle political 
messages, see, for example, Shanto Iyengar & Adam F. Simon, New Perspectives and Evidence on 
Political Communication and Campaign Effects, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 149, 156 (2000) (observing 
that the image of President Ford attempting to eat a tamale without first shucking it was an exquisitely 
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The information presented to South Africans by the TRC was also typically 
unrebutted, in part because miscreants were coming before the TRC to admit 
their crimes and to be awarded amnesty. Certainly conflict was occasionally 
involved—for example, some victims challenged the motives of the 
perpetrators, arguing for instance that they were economic not political and 
therefore not covered by the amnesty legislation. But generally the intense 
denials that often cloud political controversies were limited in the case of the 
South African truth and reconciliation process.42 
Another advantage of the South Africa process was that it largely eschewed 
formal trials in favor of public hearings in which people were allowed to come 
forth and “tell their stories.”43 To the extent that one wishes to communicate 
with the mass public—to tell stories, to get them to understand the nature of 
their past—trials are unlikely to be effective. Far more compelling is the 
testimony of ordinary people in their own narratives. And the stories that 
people tell, in their own words, can have an enormous impact on bystanders. 
Even the hardest apartheid heart could not help but have been moved by some 
of the tales of abuse and suffering told by the survivors of apartheid atrocities.44 
Even the most militant MK operative must have experienced at least a twinge 
of remorse when learning of the terrible damage done to civilians by liberation 
explosives.45 The theory of a “just war,” in which the ends justify many means, is 
an abstraction that loses some of its potency when confronted with real people 
whose lives were destroyed or irrevocably altered during the struggle. If one 
wishes to ensure that all segments of a society recognize the pain inflicted, often 
unfairly, on their enemies during the struggle, then these story-telling 
proceedings can be invaluable.46 
 
clear signal to Hispanics in the United States of the U.S. President’s lack of sensitivity to this 
constituency and explaining that subtle messages are often more effective at social persuasion than 
more-explicit appeals to attitude change). 
 42. Id. 
 43. For an account of the destruction of vital files by agents of the apartheid state, see Verne 
Harris, “They Should Have Destroyed More”: The Destruction of Public Records by the South African 
State in the Final Years of Apartheid, 1990–94, 42 TRANSFORMATION 29, 38 (2000). In the South 
African case, formal prosecutions were extremely difficult because the apartheid state was in near-total 
control of the apparatus and files of government from 1990 to 1994. For an examination of the failed 
Malan prosecution, see Paul Van Zyl, Justice Without Punishment: Guaranteeing Human Rights in 
Transitional Societies, in LOOKING BACK REACHING FORWARD, supra note 6, at 42, 46 (2000). 
 44. For an exceptional collection of stories from apartheid survivors, see ANTJIE KROG, COUNTRY 
OF MY SKULL (1998). 
 45. The MK was the military wing of the ANC. “Umkhonto we Sizwe,” ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/555568/South-Africa/260110/Resis 
tance-to-apartheid#ref=ref921038. 
 46. I do acknowledge that due process suffers under the storytelling format used by the South 
African TRC (and indeed some due-process issues were litigated in South Africa). One solution to due-
process compromises is to minimize the harm done to those who are accused, although some might 
have little concern for fully protecting those seeking amnesty for gross human-rights violations from 
due-process compromises. Justice in transitional processes is an aggregate concept, and certain types of 
injustices can be compensated for by other types of justice. See, e.g., GIBSON, supra note 3, at 258–88. In 
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Many of the factors generally contributing to persuasion in fact reinforce the 
possibility that the truth and reconciliation process might have created attitude 
change. The information was salient and interesting, accessible, subtle in its 
messages, largely unrebutted, and not as threatening as it might have been, 
thereby avoiding triggering defense mechanisms. These are the conditions likely 
to give rise to social persuasion, especially among the least sophisticated and 
attentive portions of a population. 
At the other end of the continuum, those with high cognitive sophistication 
are generally attentive to the mass media and other information sources, but, 
owing to well-developed belief systems, they are quite resistant to change.47 
Their reliance on framing, motivated reasoning, and confirmation bias all 
contribute to their being relatively more difficult to change than their less-
sophisticated counterparts.48 But the great irony is that those most likely to be 
exposed to social information are often least like to learn from it. 
Mindful of these two constituencies—respondents of low and high cognitive 
sophistication—truth commissions must take care in tailoring their messages. 
Perhaps the most effective strategy is one that focuses on the “human interest” 
dimensions of their findings. More cognitive arguments are likely to bypass the 
less sophisticated and to be easily refuted by the more sophisticated. When 
messages are obviously didactic, motivated reasoning is more likely, making 
persuasion less likely.49 On the other hand, when presented as human-interest 
stories, with no obvious vested interests or clear ideological signal, the messages 
appear likely to be much more influential.50 The essential ingredient for attitude 
change among sophisticated citizens is to make them willing to rethink their 
 
the end, the criteria by which such processes ought to be judged are surely whether on balance more 
justice than injustice results, and whether the process contributes to the consolidation of democratic 
reform. For a most useful and insightful analysis of the numerous issues surrounding amnesties, see 
Ronald Slye, Justice and Amnesty, in LOOKING BACK REACHING FORWARD, supra note 6, at 174, 177, 
and Ronald Slye, Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation: Reflections on the South African Amnesty 
Process, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 170, 171 (Robert I. Rotberg 
& Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
 47. See JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 121–22 (1992) 
(explaining the relationship between political awareness and resistance to countervailing messages). 
 48. Confirmation bias refers to the process “[through which] people, especially those who feel the 
strongest and know the most . . . seek out confirmatory evidence and avoid what they suspect might be 
disconfirming evidence.” Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of 
Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 755, 759 (2006). This bias means that contrary evidence—such as 
evidence that one’s own side may have engaged in gross human-rights violations during the struggle—
battles against preexisting attitudes justifying the old regime and its values. Less-sophisticated and less-
committed respondents suffer less from confirmation bias, but are not entirely unaffected by it. Id. 
 49. Id. The Taber and Lodge study used didactic messages, which presumably helps explain their 
relatively strong results regarding bias. 
 50. To the extent that a social consensus emerges from the findings of truth commissions, processes 
of motivated reasoning can be undermined. A “collective memory” that is truly collective—widely 
accepted within a society—is difficult to ignore or discount. However, to the extent that various 
subcommunities exist within a society, a means of resisting the broader social consensus exists. 
Subgroup norms may provide succor for minority positions, and to the extent that subgroup social 
identities are strong, the larger social consensus may be irrelevant. 
11_GIBSON_CONTRACT PROOF.DOC 8/28/2009  1:44:02 PM 
136 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:123 
views and judgments about their country’s history, such as those formed in the 
decades-long struggle against apartheid in South Africa. 
Thus, effective truth and reconciliation processes are those that succeed in 
getting people to question their basic beliefs about good and evil. In terms of 
South Africa’s past and present, the TRC proclaimed that the nature of the 
information it published loosened the hold of all citizens on their personal, 
perhaps less-damning versions of the past: 
[T]he information in the hands of the [TRC] made it impossible to claim, for example, 
that: the practice of torture by the state security forces was not systematic and 
widespread; that only a few “rotten eggs” or “bad apples” committed gross violations 
of human rights; that the state was not directly and indirectly involved in “black-on-
black” violence; that the chemical and biological warfare programme was only of a 
defensive nature; that slogans by sections of the liberation movement did not 
contribute to killings of “settlers” or farmers; and that the accounts of gross human 
rights violations in the African National Congress (ANC) camps were the 
consequence of state disinformation. Thus, disinformation about the past that had 
been accepted as truth by some members of society lost much of its credibility.51 
If one accepted the positions of the TRC, one might have come to see the 
struggle over apartheid as one of pretty-good good against pretty-bad bad, not 
as absolute good battling with infinite evil. It is difficult to reconcile with 
infinite evil; it is perhaps easier to reconcile with bad that is not entirely evil 
(especially if there is some degree of repentance). Truth may have opened the 
door to reconciliation by encouraging people to abandon their views that South 
Africa is made of people with world views so distant that they are 
unreconcilable. 
The revelations of the truth and reconciliation process may have encouraged 
self-reflection and self-criticism, resulting in more-moderate views of one’s 
adversaries in the struggle. “[T]o dismiss perpetrators simply as evildoers and 
monsters shuts the door to the kind of dialogue that leads to an enduring 
peace.”52 
Daring, on the other hand, to look the enemy in the eye and allow oneself to read 
signs of pain and cues of contrition or regret where one might almost have preferred 
to continue seeing only hatred is the one possibility we have for steering individuals 
and societies toward replacing long-standing stalemates out of a nation‘s past with 
genuine engagement. Hope is where transformation begins; without it, a society 
cannot take its first steps toward reconstructing its self-identity as a society of 
tolerance and coexistence.53 
In witnessing the human face of struggle, all sides are given the opportunity 
to rethink their understandings of good and bad, friend and foe. Such 
reconsideration can lead to a moderation of views, which opens the door to 
processes of reconciliation. 
 
 51. 1998 FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, Vol. I, at 111–12. 
 52. GOBODO-MADIKIZELA, supra note 6, at 125. 
 53. Id. at 125–26. 
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B. Institutional Legitimacy and Procedural Fairness 
The South African truth and reconciliation process succeeded in getting the 
attention of virtually all South Africans.54 But for attitudes to change, people 
must be able to view the truth commission as a credible source of information. 
It is at this point that the legitimacy of institutions becomes important, since 
institutions viewed as legitimate are more effective at persuading citizens. 
Legitimacy is “the belief that authorities, institutions, and social 
arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just.”55 It is often examined within 
the context of citizens’ concerns for mechanisms of voluntary compliance.56 The 
general hypothesis is that institutions viewed as legitimate are more successful 
at gaining compliance by citizens, even when (or especially when) the citizens 
disapprove of the decision made by the institution.57 Although truth 
commissions do not typically require that citizens comply with commission 
actions and findings,58 legitimacy is crucial to institutional credibility. And 
credible institutions are more likely to be persuasive and to succeed in getting 
citizens to accept their judgments and views.59 
A key source of institutional legitimacy is procedural fairness.60 Truth 
commissions are like trials in at least one sense: “In a trial . . . the ‘true’ 
innocence of the defendant is typically unknown, so the legitimacy of the 
verdict is established by the fairness of the trial procedures.”61 In institutions 
like truth commissions, decisionmaking processes are also viewed as fair when 
citizens are provided opportunities to participate, when citizens are given 
“voice” to express their views and their concerns.62 Another source of 
 
 54. Gibson, supra note 1, at 416. 
 55. Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 376, 376 (2006). 
 56. Id. at 383. 
 57. See, e.g., James L. Gibson et al., Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing 
Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187, 187 (2005) (arguing that the 
legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court promotes acceptance of its unpopular decisions). 
 58. FREEMAN, supra note 7, at 71. 
 59. See, e.g., James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000: 
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 554 (2003) (pointing to the controversy 
over the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore, in which the Court determined the winner of the 
2000 presidential election, and, because of the Court’s widespread legitimacy, its decision was accepted 
by both Democrats and Republicans). 
 60. See Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and 
Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Authorities? 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 233 
(2001) (finding that the public’s evaluations of the police and courts are linked primarily to whether 
individuals perceive these systems to be procedurally fair); see also FREEMAN, supra note 7, at 154 
(arguing that although tensions exist among various principles of fairness, truth commissions—as 
human rights bodies—must deliver a maximum amount of procedural fairness both to victims and 
perpetrators). 
 61. Tyler, supra note 55, at 384. 
 62. Michael X. Delli Carpini et al., Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen 
Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 314, 327 (2004) (discussing a 
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procedural fairness is rationality, which “reflects neutrality and factuality in 
decision-making.”63 
In the context of truth commissions, neutrality is probably best understood 
as involving evenhandedness—the willingness to apply general principles of 
human rights consistently, and therefore to blame all who violated the human 
rights of citizens, irrespective of what justifications might be put forth for such 
violations. (Critics of South Africa’s truth and reconciliation process often 
referred to this as “poisonous evenhandedness.”)64 Experimental research 
confirms the importance of neutrality. Some, for example, place considerable 
emphasis on the “perceived (il)legitimacy of an influence attempt.”65 As they 
see it: “A message may be seen as illegitimate because it is discrepant from the 
recipient’s vested interest, or because the communicator’s intentions are 
suspect, or because of the context in which the message is encountered.”66 This 
is particularly true of messages generating negative affect (such as revelations of 
gross human-rights violations). “A recipient who experiences negative affect 
when encountering a persuasive message and who has no reason to question the 
message’s legitimacy is likely to interpret [the messenger’s] affect as indicating a 
problematic issue. This should result in more systematic processing of the 
persuasive message.”67 Those who question the legitimacy of the message are 
likely to interpret the negative affect as a reaction to an illegitimate attempt at 
opinion change and are therefore unlikely to engage in a careful consideration 
of the message itself.68 The legitimacy of the source thus influences considerably 
the effectiveness of the message in producing attitude change. 
In the South African case, considerable evidence of the impartiality of the 
TRC is available. For instance, the TRC was sued by nearly every major 
political party in South Africa—from the African National Congress (ANC) to 
the National Party, the party of apartheid. The TRC quite reasonably treats this 
as evidence of its own evenhandedness.69 A strategy of pursuing “victor’s 
justice”—in which the victors are held to different standards than the 
vanquished—undermines the legitimacy of truth processes. If a truth–and-
reconciliation process is to be recognized as fair, it must be committed to 
unearthing and documenting human-rights abuses irrespective of the 
 
study finding that when people are given the opportunity to voice their opinions, it increases the 
perception that the process is fair and the outcome legitimate). 
 63. Tyler, supra note 55, at 384. 
 64. Gibson, supra note 1, at 416. 
 65. Gerd Bohner & Thomas Weinerth, Negative Affect Can Increase or Decrease Message Scrutiny: 
The Affect Interpretation Hypothesis, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1417, 1419 (2001). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd, Constructing a Report: Writing Up the 
“Truth”, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 287 (noting that attacks from opposing sides of the 
political spectrum countered suggestions that the TRC was biased against the former regime and 
covered up human-rights violations committed by the ANC). 
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justifications given for such abuses. Through its willingness to pursue gross 
human-rights violators irrespective of their ideology, the TRC demonstrated its 
commitment to a universal conception of the meaning of human rights. One of 
the factors contributing most to the legitimacy of the process was its willingness 
to blame all parties in the struggle, rejecting the notion that a “just war” justifies 
or excuses atrocities.70 
Crucial to the ability to blame all sides in the struggle was the independence 
of the TRC, and essential to its independence was the nature of its leadership. 
Although Archbishop Desmond Tutu has been criticized for injecting his own 
religious ideology into what many view as a largely secular process,71 thereby 
moving “forgiveness” to the forefront of reconciliation,72 there can be little 
doubt that Tutu’s impeccable integrity and commitment to the liberation of 
South Africa shielded the TRC from many partisan attacks.73 
That the TRC was willing to blame all who committed gross human-rights 
violations points as well to the significance of procedural justice in truth and 
reconciliation processes. The perception of procedural fairness is perhaps the 
most important asset of truth processes, since perceived fairness enhances 
legitimacy.74 The TRC blundered several times—as in its decision to grant 
blanket amnesty to the leaders of the ANC, a decision ultimately overturned by 
the Constitutional Court—but generally the commission’s willingness to give all 
parties a voice in the process contributed mightily to its legitimacy and 
influence. 
The most pressing task of a truth commission is to establish legitimacy with 
the members of a society. Legitimacy typically requires fair and reasonably 
transparent procedures. For truth commissions, fairness is most clearly 
demonstrated by evenhandedness. Commissions expressing bias against any 
 
 70. Gibson, supra note 8, at 96–101. 
 71. See RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATES 107–10 (2001) (noting that the official view of 
reconciliation was an abstract approach to healing on a national level and juxtaposing it with the 
religious view advocated by Archbishop Desmond Tutu calling for reconciliation and forgiveness on an 
individual level). 
 72. Wilson is especially critical of the religious veneer often associated with the truth and 
reconciliation process: 
[I]t is misguided to delegitimize human rights at the national level by detaching them from a 
retributive understanding of justice and attaching them to a religious notion of reconciliation–
forgiveness, a regrettable amnesty law and an elite project of nation-building. Democratizing 
regimes should not seek legitimacy through nation-building, efforts to forge a moral unity and 
communitarian discourses, but on the basis of accountability and justice defined as 
proportional retribution and procedural fairness. The role of human rights and the rule of law 
in all this is to create the bedrock of accountability upon which democratic legitimacy is built. 
Id. at 230. 
 73. See Gibson, supra note 1, at 426–27 (describing Tutu’s effectiveness). 
 74. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 57 (2002) (finding that by behaving in ways that are 
perceived as procedurally fair, police officers and courts can gain increased citizen consent and 
cooperation with decisions). 
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particular community or political position undermine their position as a 
credible source of information about the past. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Survey data from South Africa indicates that the South African people as a 
whole are quite satisfied with the performance of their truth and reconciliation 
process.75 This finding is important since it shows that granting concessions to 
the disempowered minority does not necessarily alienate the victorious majority 
in transitional systems. 
The South African example teaches several important and most likely 
generalizable lessons. Perhaps most crucially, reconciliation ought to focus on 
the entire society, not just on victims and perpetrators. The experiences of those 
directly involved in the struggle must be publicized and legitimized so that the 
bystanders—the overwhelming majority of most conflicted societies—can learn 
the lessons of reconciliation. 
The most potent such lesson is that all sides have legitimate grievances, even 
if not in equal numbers, nor with equal responsibility or culpability. But the 
indispensable lesson of transitional justice ought to be that no party to violent 
conflicts ought to be allowed to violate human rights with impunity, even when 
the perpetrators have just cause. Even those struggling against a regime as evil 
as apartheid (or as insidious as the regime of Saddam Hussein) must be bound 
by basic human-rights principles. To the extent that principles of justice and 
accountability are applied universally, truth commissions will be seen as fair and 
impartial, and hence legitimate and credible. 
That no side is excused does not mean that retribution is unnecessary. The 
need for retributive justice is only one component of a large set of justice 
expectations and demands. Some types of justice are fungible; procedural 
justice may even substitute for the failure to achieve distributive justice.76 
Governments must not ignore the justice demands of their citizens, but they 
should be cognizant that one form of justice can often compensate for the 
denial of another. 
For many reasons, the South African experience should not be replicated 
lock, stock, and barrel in other parts of the world. The process in South Africa 
was expensive, perhaps too expensive for many countries attempting to dig 
themselves out of the mire of civil war. And, as it turns out, a relatively small 
proportion of the South African population believes itself to have been 
 
 75. James L. Gibson, The Truth About Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, 26 INT’L POL. SCI. 
REV. 341, 356 (2005). 
 76. See James L. Gibson, Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation: Judging the Fairness of Amnesty in 
South Africa, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 540, 540–56 (2002) (arguing that it may be possible to compensate for 
the inherent injustice of amnesties through other forms of justice, such as procedural, retributive, 
restorative, and distributive justice). 
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seriously victimized by apartheid. (In the end, only twenty-one thousand or so 
official victims of gross human-rights violations were identified.)77 Moreover, 
the South African process was enormously time-consuming, and it relied upon 
what seems to be the boundless patience of ordinary South Africans. The South 
African truth and reconciliation process was designed to respond to the specific 
circumstances of that society, and that is surely the first desideratum for all 
transitional efforts. 
But whatever the local circumstances of those contemplating efforts at 
reconciliation, the lessons of the South African experience ought to be heeded. 
In societies torn by a history of violent conflict, the past must be overcome. 
Those at the helms of transitional systems should never forget that the 
consolidation of democratic reform is the ultimate objective, and that advancing 
the cause of democracy cannot prosper without some degree of reconciliation 
among citizens, groups, and cultures. 
Truth is important because it is true. But evenhandedness provides a 
crucially important resource to truth commissions: institutional legitimacy. 
Without legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary people, a truth commission cannot 
effectively promulgate its views about the past. Legitimate institutions are 
credible, and credible institutions hold the potential to persuade people. To the 
extent that people can be persuaded to adopt a nuanced view of the struggles of 
the past, reconciliation itself becomes possible. 
 
 
 
 77.  1998 FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 196. 
